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DYING LIKE MEN, FALLING LIKE PRINCES: REFLECTIONS ON
THE WAR ON TERROR
Edward Rial Armstrong*
I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of one's jurisprudential philosophy or political leanings, we
can all agree that, for good or for ill, laws and lawmakers can have a pro-
found impact on society. When lawmakers formulate policy and shape the
law, we can all feel the weight of their hands. Perhaps it was a keen aware-
ness of the significant role that lawmakers play in society that explains, in
part, the widespread tendency that existed among ancient peoples to revere
their rulers as incarnate gods.' One ancient Hebraic text illustrating this ten-
dency provides as follows:
God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he judgeth among the
gods.
How long will ye judge unjustly, and accept the persons of the wicked?
Selah.
I have said, Ye are gods; and all of you are children of the most High.
2But ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes.
* Edward Rial Armstrong is a practicing attorney at the law firm of Wright, Lindsey &
Jennings, LLP, where his focus is on transactional law, real property law, and estate planning.
He received a B.A in Comparative Literature from Brigham Young University, a B.A. in
psychology from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, and a J.D. from the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. He is madly in love with Amy
Ryals Armstrong, whom he has the privilege of being married to and with whom he shares
the adventure of raising their four children.
1. It was not uncommon for ancient people to believe that heir rulers were divine in-
carnations and/or descendants of deity. See SIR JAMES GEORGE FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH
(1922), available at http://www.bartleby.com/196/15.html (last visited May 10, 2007). Al-
though the importance of the societal role filled by rulers may have contributed to their hav-
ing been regarded as divine, it is also certain that some ancient rulers played an active part in
promulgating the notion of their divinity. Take, for example, Alexander the Great, who popu-
larized the notion that he was the son of Jupiter, and Augustus Caesar, who sought to be
worshipped as a descendant of Venus.
2. Psalms 82:1-4, 6-7 (King James).
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Note that the Hebrew word U,"ft or "elohim," which is translated
into the words "God," "gods," and "mighty" in the foregoing passage from
the King James Version of the Bible, is rendered "judges" in other English
translations of the same text.' The fact that elohim can be translated as either
God, gods or judges depending on the context and the preference of the
translator suggests that, at one point in their history, the ancient Israelites
may have regarded their rulers as gods. However, the same text also distin-
guishes between gods and God-the mighty and the Almighty, by portray-
ing the gods as imperfect beings subject to both death and divine jurisdic-
tion.
Because our modem and increasingly secular society has largely aban-
doned the notion of rulers as divine,4 I would hazard to guess that the text's
conceit of rulers as gods has little resonance with many contemporary read-
ers. However, given the vast power that is ours to command in this technol-
ogical age, there is something in the text's conceit of gods faced with their
own mortality and the limits of their power that can serve as an apt and poe-
tic description of the modem5 existential plight. After all, we live in an age
when people can fly through the sky and walk on the moon; an age in which
many horrible diseases that once claimed countless lives can be prevented
with a simple injection; an age in which one man can kill dozens in a matter
of seconds and a dozen men can kill thousands in a matter of minutes. In-
deed, in that respect, we are gods, and yet we can still die like men.
The text's reminder that princes--considered as a symbol of empire-
may fall from their elevated stations is also relevant for our time. In our
modem era it has been shown that even a great empire can fall precipitously
despite its military might. The former Soviet Union rose and fell in less than
a century. It is worth noting that the fall of the Soviet Union was not brought
about by a military defeat, but, in part, by unsustainable military spending
that strained the Soviet economy.6 There may be a lesson in that for our na-
tion and its leaders.
3. In the MODERN LANGUAGE BIBLE, Psalms 82:1 is translated as follows: "God stands
in the congregation of the Gods; in the midst of the judges He gives judgment." Psalms 82:1
(Modem Language). In the LIVING BIBLE, this same passage is rendered as follows: "God
stands up to open heaven's court. He pronounces judgment on the judges." Psalms 82:1 (Liv-
ing Bible).
4. To this day, however, the imperial family of Japan claims descent from the sun
goddess Encyclopedia Britannica, Amaterasu Omikami Amaterasu,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9006019/Amaterasu (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
5. The term "modem" is employed herein in its simple vernacular and ordinary sense
as a reference to the present or the recent contiguous past, and is not meant to suggest that the
author has decided that the term postmodern is not more properly applicable.
6. See Celeste A. Wallander, Western Policy and the Demise of the Soviet Union, 5 J. OF
COLD WAR STUD. 4, 137 (2003); see generally Paul Kennedy, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
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The attacks of September 11, 2001, brought home the point that even a
mighty nation like ours is vulnerable to injury, and that even a goliath can
sometimes be dealt a serious blow by a much smaller opponent. Faced with
a world in which individuals can wield incredible destructive power and in
which economic weakness can cause an empire to collapse despite its mili-
tary might, what types of policies and laws should we adopt to confront
these realities? In particular, what types of laws and policies should we
adopt to deal with the threat of terrorism? This article proceeds on the pre-
mises that we should adopt laws and policies that reduce rather than exacer-
bate the threat of terrorism and that we should avoid profligate spending
policies that dissipate our nation's economic strength. Part II considers the
attacks of September 11, 2001 and the government's response thereto. Part
III introduces various legal definitions of terrorism. Particular consideration
is given to the definitions provided in the Arkansas Anti-Terrorism Act of
2003 (the "Anti-Terrorism Act") and the Uniting and Strengthening Ameri-
ca by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Ter-
rorism Act (the PATRIOT Act). Part IV criticizes certain aspects of these
definitions. Part V provides a summary outline-with editorial comment-
of some of the dramatic changes in law and policy that have been made at
the national level in response to the threat of terrorism. Part VI examines the
nature of the problem and proposes alternative approaches for addressing
the threat of terrorism. Part VII concludes the article.
II. TERRORISM AND THE MENACE OF MASS DESTRUCTION
By mid-morning of September 11, 2001, millions of anguished faces
stared numbly at the billowing black clouds of ash and smoke that rose from
the smoldering rubble of what had been the twin towers of the World Trade
Center.7 Just a few hours earlier, at 8:44 a.m., the World Trade Center had
been bustling with its ordinary activity, and the twin towers, each standing
110 stories tall,8 dominated the New York City skyline. At 8:45 a.m., all of
that changed. Glass shattered, steel sundered, and the world changed as a
commercial airliner-carrying ninety-two victims and approximately 10,000
GREAT POWERS (1987) (examining the role of military overextension in the collapse of super
powers).
7. CNN.com, September 11: Chronology of Terror, Sept. 12, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/1 l/chronology.attack [hereinafter September 11: Chro-
nology of Terror]. The north tower of the World Trade Center collapsed at 10:05 a.m., and
the south tower collapsed at 10:28 a.m. Id.
8. The World Trade Center: Statistics and History,
http://www.skyscraper.org/TALLESTTOWERS/twtc.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
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gallons of jet fuel-crashed into the north tower.9 As the tragic news was
being broadcast, the world watched in stunned disbelief as a second airliner
slammed into the south tower of the World Trade Center and burst into a
massive ball of fire.'0 The explosion sent shockwaves through the tower and
the rest of the country. While many were still reeling from the news, a third
airliner struck the Pentagon, headquarters of the United States Department
of Defense, causing part of it to collapse." A fourth airliner crashed south-
east of Pittsburgh, in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, killing all on board. 2
In a matter of hours, approximately 3000 people died as a direct result of
these attacks. 3
Our national government responded swiftly and dramatically to the at-
tacks, immediately instituting a ban on civilian flights over the United
States. 4 It was the first shutdown of civilian aviation in the history of the
United States. 5 At 1:04 p.m., President Bush announced that all appropriate
security measures were being taken, including putting the United States mil-
itary on high alert worldwide. 6 He solicited prayers for the victims of the
attacks and their families and vowed that "the United States will hunt down
and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts."' 7 The following day,
President Bush addressed the Nation and declared war against the enemy,
9. Id.; The 9/11 Commission Report, http://www.9-
11 commission.gov/report/9 11 ReportExec.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
10. CNN.com, Terror Attacks Hit US., Sept. 11, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/201/JS/09/11/worldtrade.crash/index.html. In certain parts of the
world the news was reportedly celebrated. Celebrations of the September 11, 2001 Attacks,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Celebrations of theSeptember11,_2001 attacks (last visited
Apr. 16, 2007). Some Muslim communities have apparently turned the anniversary into a
cause for reflection and celebration. London Muslims "Celebrate" 9/11, http://www.city-
joumal.org/html/12_4_sndgs03.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
11. September 11: Chronology of Terror, supra note 7.
12. Id.
13. September 11, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/marchll/timeline/one.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2007). The incredible destructive power of large, fully fueled airliners clear-
ly has numerous implications for the law regulating commercial flights. For a detailed discus-
sion of some of these, see Phillip A. Karber, Re-Constructing Global Aviations in an Era of
the Civil Aircraft as a Weapon of Destruction, HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 781 (2002) (which
notes that the destructive power of a fully fueled airliner exceeds that of a small nuclear de-
vice).
14. Testimony of Secretary of Transportation, Norman Y. Mineta, indicates that he gave
the FAA the final order for all civilian planes to land at 9:45 a.m. Norman Y. Mineta, State-
ment of Secretary of Transporation Norman Y. Mineta Before the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (May 23, 2003), available at
http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/03test/Mineta6.htm.
15. Id.
16. September 11: Chronology of Terror, supra note 7.
17. Id.
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without identifying any enemy by name."8 By September 13, 2001, officials
of the Bush administration were publicly identifying Osama Bin Laden and
the AI-Qaeda terrorist group as the likely suspects.19 On September 18, 2001
the United States Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military
Force bill, which authorized the President to
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of in-
ternational terrorism against the United States by such nations, organiza-
tions or persons.2°
The bill was signed into law the same day.2'
Two days later, before a joint session of Congress, President Bush once
again declared "war on terror," this time naming Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden
specifically. 22 He committed to wage the war on terror not only against
them, but also against every terrorist organization of "global reach" in the
world.23 President Bush demanded that the Taliban government of Afghanis-
tan immediately and unconditionally hand over Bin Laden and the leaders of
the Al-Qaeda network. When his demands were not met, President Bush
authorized military strikes against various targets in Afghanistan on October
7, 2001. 24 This operation, styled Operation Enduring Freedom,25 initiated a
18. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the
National Security Team, (Sept. 12, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html); White House, Res-
ponses and Recovery, http://www.whitehouse.gov/marchl 1/timeline/three.html (last visited
Apr. 2007).
19. On September 13, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed in a briefing that
the administration viewed al Qaeda and the Saudi exile as the leading suspect. "We will go
after that group, that network and those who have harbored, supported and aided that net-
work, to rip that network up, and when we are through with that network, we will continue
with a global assault against terrorism in general." Steve Mufson & Alan Sipress, Powell
Calls Bin Landen Prime Suspect, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at A6.
20. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006).
21. Press Release, White House, President Signs Authorization for Use of Military Force
Bill (Sept. 18, 2001) (available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010918-10.html).
22. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People, (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html) ("Our war on terror
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped[,] and defeated.").
23. Id.
24. President George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation, (Oct. 7, 2001) (tran-
script available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/200ll007-8.html);
United States Dept. of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Appendix G: The United States
20071
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military campaign in Afghanistan that continues to the day of this writing. A
detention center was set up in a military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
where persons identified as enemy combatants were, and still are, detained
and questioned.26 On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an execu-
tive order establishing military tribunals for enemy combatants.27
In his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, President Bush
was already declaring that America and Afghanistan had become allies
against terror,28 and in a statement that presaged a shift towards United
States military involvement in Iraq, President Bush stated that Iraq "contin-
ue[d] to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror" and that
"[t]he Iraqi regime ha[d] plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuc-
lear weapons for over a decade., 29 Officials in the Bush Administration be-
gan turning away from Osama Bin Laden as the focal point of the war on
terror and began focusing on Iraq as a grave and growing danger.3° On vari-
ous occasions, Bush officials indicated that there were extensive ties be-
tween Iraq and AI-Qaeda and that there was a possible link between Iraq and
the attacks of 9/11.3 In his radio address on September 7, 2002, Bush cha-
racterized Iraq as a grave and growing danger perhaps only a year away
from developing nuclear capacity and indicated that Iraq had illicitly sought
to purchase the equipment needed to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.32
Bush stated that Iraq had proven itself to be a danger by "supporting terrorist
groups, repressing its own people and pursuing weapons of mass destruction
in defiance of a decade of U.N. resolutions. ' 33 On September 12, 2002, Pres-
Military Campaign in Afghanistan, (May 12, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/200I/html/ I0262.htm.
25. White House, Operation Enduring Freedom,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/defense/enduringfreedom.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2007).
26. See, e.g., Katharine Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Prisoners; Move Likely for Inmate
Who May be American, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,2002, at Al.
27. Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror-
ism, §2(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
28. Press Release, White House, President Delivers State of the Union Address (Jan. 29,
2002) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html).
29. Id.
30. Andrea Lynn, Bush Administration Has Used 27 Rationales for Way in Iraq, (May
10, 2004) http://www.news.uiuc.edu/news/04/0510war.html.
31. Walter Pinkus & Dana Milbank, Al Qaeda-Hussein Link Is Dismissed, (June 17,
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A47812-2004Junl6.html. However,
the weight of evidence suggests that there was no reliable basis for making such a link. See
KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ 157 (2002);
Elizabeth de la Vega, UNITED STATES v. GEORGE W. BUSH (Feb. 10, 2007).
32. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Growing Danger Posed by Saddam
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ident Bush challenged the United Nations to address the threat posed by Iraq
as highlighted by its continuing defiance of the Security Council.34 On Sep-
tember 28, 2002, President Bush announced that he was seeking a strong
resolution from Congress authorizing the use of force to defend our national
security interests against the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.3" In March
2003, without explicit Security Council approval, President Bush launched
"Operation Iraqi Freedom" to disarm Iraq and change its regime. 36 The mili-
tary campaign was broadened beyond the initially stated aims of disarming
and overthrowing Saddam Hussein's government so as to include the com-
pulsory introduction of democratic governance into Iraq. 37 Administration
officials maintained that the war in Iraq was an integral part of the war on
terror.3 s
To aid the executive branch in its war on terror at home and abroad,
Congress passed several new laws expanding executive power.39 In addition
to these express grants of power from Congress, the President-by virtue of
implicit and inherent authority-adopted several new policies and programs
on his own initiative to address the threat of "terrorism."40
34. President's Address to U.N. General Assembly, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1529
(Sept. 12, 2002), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-
1.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
35. President George W. Bush, Radio Address by the President to the Nation (Sept. 28,
2002) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020928.html).
36. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Free-
dom (Mar. 22, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html); Colum Lynch, Dissent
Grows at U.N. over Iran (Nov. 5, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/l1/04/AR2006110400959.html. Indeed, Secretary-General of the
U.N., Kofi Annan, characterized the 2003 Iraq invasion as illegal. Patrick E. Tyler, U.N.
Chief Ignites Firestorm by Calling Iraq War 'Illegal,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at Al1.
37. President Geroge W. Bush, President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Free-
dom (Mar. 22, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html and
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060902.html) ("A vital part of our
strategy to defeat the terrorists is to help establish a democratic Iraq, which will be a beacon
of liberty in the region and an ally in the global war on terror.").
38. Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: United States Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Gover-
nance, at 11, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19708.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2007).
39. These laws include the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropri-
ate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (the
PATRIOT Act); the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 111; and the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366.
40. As to the policies adopted and programs implemented by the current administration,
the exact nature and extent of them remains unknown because apparently important aspects
of them have been implemented secretly and without express Congressional authorization.
Two such programs that have come to light include a domestic surveillance program, and the
2007]
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III. TERRORISM: DEFINING THE PROBLEM
By the end of September 2001, the war on terror was off to a solid start
despite the fact that there was, and still is, considerable debate among legal
scholars and the international community as to the precise definition of ter-
rorism.41 There are even varying definitions of terrorism amongst agencies
of the federal government. The United States Department of State, for ex-
ample, defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandes-
tine agents," usually intended to influence an audience.42 The United States
Department of Defense defines terrorism as "[t]he calculated use of unlaw-
ful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to
coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that
are generally political, religious, or ideological."43 In the Code of Federal
Regulations, terrorism is defined to include "the unlawful use of force and
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government,
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives." The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (the
Patriot Act), defines "domestic terrorism" as activities that
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the crim-
inal laws of the United States or of any State;
use of secret prisons where persons are held incommunicado, reportedly tortured, and denied
traditional due process. Jim VandHei & Dan Eggen, Cheney Cites Justifications for Domestic
Eavesdropping (Jan. 5, 2006) http://www.washingtonpost.comi/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/04/AR2006010400973.html; CNN.com, Rights Group Leader
Says U.S. Has Secret Jails, (June 6, 2005)
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/06/05/amnesty.detainee.
41. There is considerable disagreement among academics as to the proper and precise
definition of terrorism. See, e.g. George P. Fletcher, The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism, 4
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 894 (2006); Alex Schmid, Terrorism-The Definitional Problem, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375, 376 (2004). If one considers that the Boston Tea Party could
have been considered an act of terrorism from the perspective of the British crown, it is ap-
parent that the terms terrorism and patriotism, which carry such different connotations, may
occasionally be used in all sincerity by different speakers to characterize the same act based
on upon the speaker's values and socio-politico perspective. Because use of the term "terror-
ism" may be subjectively value laden, some news organizations have been wary of using it in
certain instances. See Stanley Fish, Don't Blame Relativism, 12 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY
27, 30 (2002).
42. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006).
43. Dept. of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 538 (Joint Publica-
tion 1-02, Apr. 12, 2001) (as amended through Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/j el/newjpubs/jpl_02.pdf.
44. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1) (2007).
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(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruc-
tion, assassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.45
None of these federal definitions define terrorism in terms of the num-
ber of people affected by the conduct described. Consequently, so long as
the other elements of the definitions are satisfied, an act may be found to
constitute terrorism even where there is only one victim. However, as de-
fined by the Arkansas Anti-Terrorism Act of 2003 (the "Anti-Terrorism
Act"), 46 the number of persons killed or seriously injured by an act-or
merely threatened with the risk of death or serious injury by an act-may
actually determine whether that act constitutes an "act of terrorism. '47 Under
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2006). Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802(a), 115 Stat. 272,
376 (2001).
46. In 2003, the General Assembly enacted the Arkansas Anti-Terrorism Act of 2003
Act 1342 of 2003, codified at ARK CODE ANN. §§ 5-10-101, 5-38-101 to -202, 5-54-201 to
-210, 5-71-210 (LEXIS Supp. 2003), and added a subchapter, entitled Terrorism, to Title 5,
Chapter 54 of the Arkansas Code. Therein the General Assembly declares that it is illegal for
any person to (1) commit an act of terrorism, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-201(l)(A)-(G); (2)
"render criminal assistance" to any person who has committed or intends to commit an act of
terrorism, id. § 5-54-201(14)(A)-(G)); solicit support for terrorism, id. § 5-54-202(a)(1)(A);
make a threat of terrorism, id. at § 5-54-203(a)-(c); make a fake threat of terrorism, id. § 5-
54-204(a)-(b) (Repl. 2005); hinder the prosecution of a terrorist, id. § 5-54-207(a)-(b) (Repl.
2005); expose the public to biological, chemical, or radioactive substances, id. at § 5-54-
208(a)-(b); or use a "hoax substance" for the purpose of frightening the public. Id. § 5-54-
209(a)-(b).
47. The Anti-Terrorism Act defines an act of terrorism as follows:
(A) Any act that causes or creates a risk of death or serious physical injury to
five (5) or more persons;
(B) Any act that disables or destroys the usefulness or operation of any commu-
nications system;
(C) Any act or any series of two (2) or more acts committed in furtherance of a
single intention, scheme, or design that disables or destroys the usefulness or op-
eration of a computer network, computers, computer programs, or data used by:
(i) Any industry;
(ii) Any class of business;
(iii) Five (5) or more businesses;
(iv) The United States Government;
(v) State government;
(vi) Any unit of local government;
2007]
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the Anti-Terrorism Act, a person commits the criminal offense of "terror-
ism" if he or she knowingly commits an "act of terrorism" within the state
of Arkansas or even outside of the state of Arkansas if the act "takes effect
within this state or produces substantial detrimental effects within this
state.
48
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFINITIONS OF THE PROBLEM
One clear distinction between the various federal definitions of terror-
ism noted above and the definition of an act of terrorism set forth in the An-
ti-Terrorism Act is that the Arkansas definition of an act of terrorism makes
no reference to the actor's actual or apparent intent.49 Consequently, as de-
(vii) A public utility;
(viii) A manufacturer of pharmaceuticals;
(ix) A national defense contractor; or
(x) A manufacturer of chemical or biological products used in con-
nection with agricultural production;
(D) Any act that disables or causes substantial damage to or destruction of any
structure or facility used in or in connection with:
(i) Ground, air, or water transportation;
(ii) The production or distribution of electricity, gas, oil, or other
fuel;
(iii) The treatment of sewage or the treatment or distribution of wa-
ter; or
(iv) Controlling the flow of any body of water;
(E) Any act that causes substantial damage to or destruction of livestock or crops
or a series of two (2) or more acts committed in furtherance of a single intention,
scheme, or design which, in the aggregate, causes substantial damage to or de-
struction of livestock or crops;
(F) Any act that causes substantial damage to or destruction of:
(i) Any hospital; or
(ii) Any building or facility used by:
(a) The United States Government;
(b) State government;
(c) Any unit of local government;
(d) A national defense contractor;
(e) A public utility; or
(f) A manufacturer of chemical or biological products
used in or in connection with agricultural production or
the storage or processing of agricultural products or the
preparation of agricultural products for food or food
products intended for resale or for feed for livestock; or
(G) Any act that causes damage of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) to
any building or set of buildings.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-201(1) (Repl. 2005).
48. Id. § 5-54-205(a).
49. Interestingly enough, under the statutory definitions provided in the Anti-Terrorism
Act, one may commit an act of terrorism without becoming a terrorist as defined in the Act.
[Vol. 29
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fined in the Anti-Terrorism Act, one may negligently commit an act of ter-
rorism. For example, accidentally crashing into a utility pole and downing
some cable and electrical lines seems to satisfy the definitional elements of
an act of terrorism.50 Similarly, so does carelessly dropping a cigarette that
ends up starting a fire that causes more than $500,000 worth of damage to a
building or set of buildings.5 Taking the statute literally, even smoking in a
crowded restaurant arguably constitutes an act of terrorism since exposing a
room full of persons to second hand smoke may cause or create a risk of
death to five or more persons.52 However, much to the relief of a person who
may inadvertently commit an act of terrorism as defined in the Anti-
Terrorism Act, an act of terrorism is not punishable as a criminal offense
under the Arkansas criminal code unless the actor knowingly commits the
act of terrorism
with the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influ-
ence the policy of a unit of government by using intimidation or
coercion, affect the conduct of a unit or level of government by
intimidation or coercion, or retaliate against a civilian population
or unit of government for a policy or conduct.53
Another distinctive feature of the Anti-Terrorism Act's definition of an
act of terrorism is that an act that results in death or serous injury and/or
creates a risk of death and/or serious physical injury may not rise to the level
of an act of terrorism unless "five (5) or more persons" die, are seriously
injured, or are subjected to risk of death or serious injury by the act.54 As a
The Anti-Terrorism Act defines a terrorist as "any person who engages in or is about to en-
gage in a terrorist act with the purpose to intimidate or coerce a significant portion of the
civilian population or influence the policy of a government or a unit of government." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-54-201 (15). Consequently, one who engages in or is about to engage in a
"terrorist act" may or may not be a terrorist, depending on actor's purpose.
50. AK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-201(l)(D)(ii).
51. Id. § 5-54-201(l)(G).
52. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-201(1)(A); American Lung Association, Secondhand
Smoke Fact Sheet (Aug. 2006)
http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=dvLUK9O0E&b=35422 ("Secondhand smoke expo-
sure causes disease and premature death in children and adults who do not smoke. Second-
hand smoke contains hundreds of chemicals known to be toxic or carcinogenic, including
formaldehyde, benzene, vinyl chloride, arsenic ammonia and hydrogen cyanide.") I am inter-
ested in seeing whether the legislature or the courts will eventually specify either the degree
or immediacy of the risk of death or injury that an act must present in order to constitute an
act of terrorism. Until then, non-smokers have a good faith basis for advising people who
light up in an Arkansas restaurant that such an act is not only illegal, but may even constitute
an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-205(a) (Repl. 2005).
54 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-201(1)(A).
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result of this numerical threshold, it is easy to conceive of a broad class of
acts that would qualify as terrorist acts under federal definitions of terrorism
but that may fall outside of the definition of an act of terrorism provided in
the Anti-Terrorism Act (for example, kidnapping the Governor's wife and
demanding that the Governor pardon an old traffic offense of Mick Jagger's
in exchange for her safe release). Such an act would clearly fall within the
scope of the federal definitions of terrorism but would not necessarily rise to
the level of an "act of terrorism" under the Anti-Terrorism Act if it were
carried out in manner that seriously injured or killed fewer than five people
and put fewer than five people at risk of death or serious injury.55
The foregoing observations suggest that the Anti-Terrorism Act's defi-
nition of an act of terrorism is both too broad, in that it appears to encom-
pass a great number of activities that fall outside of what would generally be
regarded as terrorist (or even criminal) acts, and too narrow, in that its nu-
merical threshold clearly disallows its application to many acts that would
commonly be considered terrorist acts.56
Turning to the national level, it should be noted that the definition of
domestic terrorism provided in the Patriot Act also has its critics, such as
Nadine Strossen, President of the ACLU, who contends that the definition of
terrorism under the Patriot Act is "too broad, permitting the special surveil-
lance powers granted by [the Patriot Act] to be applied far beyond what is
commonly thought of by the term."57 Perhaps it is not altogether inappro-
55 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-201(l)(A). For those unfamiliar with Arkansas politics,
the notion of the Governor employing his executive power to pardon an old traffic offense for
one of the Rolling Stones may seem absurd and surreal. Someone familiar with Arkansas
politics, however, is likely to know that former Governor of Arkansas Mike Huckabee par-
doned Rolling Stone guitarist Keith Richards for a 1975 reckless driving conviction. USATo-
day, Governor Prepares Pardon for Guitarist's Reckless Driving Ticket.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-19-richards-pardonx.htm (last visited May
10, 2007). Of course, the fact that a former Arkansas governor actually employed his pardon-
ing power in such a fashion does not necessarily require anyone to relinquish the notion that
such a use of gubernatorial power is absurd.
56. Another part of the Anti-Terrorism Act that could use some fine tuning is Arkansas
Code Annotated section 5-54-204(a), under which a person may commit the offense of false-
ly communicating a terrorist threat where he or she "otherwise creates the impression or
belief that a terrorist act is about to be or has been committed." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-
204(a) (Repl. 2005).
57. ACLU, Surveilance Powers: A Chart,
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/14921res20011010.htnil (last visited April 25, 2007).
The Patriot Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 2331 to include the above definition of "domestic ter-
rorism." See Patriot Act, supra note 45, § 802. This definition closely parallels the preexist-
ing definition of "international terrorism," which is defined as activities that "appear to be
intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by
mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2001).
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priate for Ms. Strossen to characterize the Patriot Act's definition of domes-
tic terrorism as overbroad. After all, as defined in the Patriot Act, domestic
terrorism includes every act that is dangerous to human life that violates any
criminal law of any state or of the United States and that appears to be
intended for one of the proscribed purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(5)(B).59
Because the Patriot Act's sweeping definition of domestic terrorism in-
corporates the entire body of criminal law of each state as well as federal
criminal law, federal agents may select from the vast array of options pro-
vided by the totality of the criminal law of the nation and the various states
when trying to make the case that any given activity that they wish to inves-
tigate falls within the definition of domestic terrorism. This is significant
because the Patriot Act greatly expands governmental powers to investigate
and counter "terrorism,"6 and some of these expanded powers are applica-
ble to the investigation of "domestic terrorism." The broader the scope of
the definition of domestic terrorism, the broader the reach of Uncle Sam's
enhanced executive powers.
One of these expanded powers is the civil seizure of terrorist assets.
Section 806 of the Patriot Act can result in the civil seizure of a person's
assets without a prior hearing and without the person ever being convicted
of a crime.6' Section 806 amended the civil asset forfeiture statute62 by
granting the government authority to seize and forfeit the following:
(G) All assets, foreign or domestic-
58. To some degree this seems to federalize every state criminal code and imposes the
criminal code of every state on the citizens of every state. Given the magnitude of the body of
law that is subsumed under the Patriot Act's definition of domestic terrorism, it stretches the
limits of credulity to imagine that any person of ordinary intelligence could be sufficiently
familiar with the criminal code of every state and the United States so as to know at any
given moment exactly what conduct falls within the definition of domestic terrorism, espe-
cially if one considers that the definition will vary each time that the federal government or
any state adds, amends, or repeals a criminal law. This tends to weigh against a finding that
the statute unambiguously puts persons of ordinary intelligence on notice of exactly what
conduct is to be avoided. Although state and federal statutes are generally entitled to a strong
presumption of constitutionality, they may be invalid as being impermissibly vague if they
fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice to know what conduct is prohibited so
that she may act accordingly. Ark. Tobacco Control Bd. v. Sitton, 357 Ark. 357, 362, 166
S.W.3d 550, 553 (2004).
59. Under this definition it seems that anyone who organizes and/or participates in a
protest march, a strike, or other such political demonstration involving some degree of civil
disobedience should tread carefully lest he or she be deemed to appear to be seeking to influ-
ence the government policy by intimidation or coercion.
60. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006) (authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic
communications relating to terrorism).
61. See Patriot Act, supra note 45, § 806.
62. Id. § 981(a)(1).
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(i) of any individual, entity, or organization engaged in plan-
ning or perpetrating any Federal crime of terrorism (as de-
fined in section 2332b(g)(5)) against the United States, citi-
zens or residents of the United States, or their property, and
all assets, foreign or domestic, affording any person a source
of influence over any such entity or organization;
(ii) acquired or maintained by any person with the intent and
for the purpose of supporting, planning, conducting, or con-
cealing any Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in section
2332b(g)(5) against the United States, citizens or residents of
the United States, or their property;
(iii) derived from, involved in, or used or intended to be used
to commit any Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in sec-
tion 2332b(g)(5)) against the United States, citizens or resi-
dents of the United States, or their property;
63
Accordingly, the government can seize and/or freeze all of a person's
assets on the mere assertion that there is probable cause to believe that the
assets were involved in domestic terrorism. 64 The assets are seized before a
person is given a hearing, 6 but in order to render the seizure a permanent
forfeiture, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence at
a civil hearing that the assets were involved in terrorism.6 6 As a practical
matter, however, the hearing may not provide a person with a very meaning-
ful opportunity to present a competent legal defense given that (1) the per-
son is not entitled to be represented by an attorney at public expense because
the hearing is a civil proceeding, 67 and (2) the person may find it difficult to
pay an attorney to represent him or her at the hearing when all of the per-
son's assets are frozen and/or in government custody.68 If a few months pass
between the seizure and the forfeiture hearing, a person whose assets have
been seized may already have been reduced to pauperism by the time he gets
his day in court.
Another expanded power is the power to obtain business and other
records through an ex-parte hearing in a secret court without a warrant or
probable cause. Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows the Federal Bureau of
63. Id. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i)-(iii).
64. Id. § 981(b)(2)(B).
65. See id. § 981(b)(2).
66. Id. § 983(c).
67. See Patriot Act, supra note 45, § 983(b) (2006) (providing representation to indigent
person in a civil forfeiture proceeding only if the person is currently the subject of an ongoing
criminal prosecution or if the property involved is real property being used by the indigent
person as a primary residence).
68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the assets of
foreign terrorist organizations).
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Investigation (FBI) to order any person or entity to turn over "any tangible
things, (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)" pro-
vided the FBI "speciflies]" that the order is "for an authorized investigation.
. to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activi-
ties."69 Those served with Section 215 orders are prohibited from disclosing
the fact to anyone else,7" and as a result, the subjects of the surveillance are
never notified that their privacy has been compromised.
Section 219 of the Patriot Act allows for nationwide search warrants,
and it can be used in a manner that, as a practical matter, makes it very diffi-
cult to challenge a search warrant. Prior to passage of the Patriot Act a
search warrant and other surveillance orders were generally valid only with-
in the federal district in which they were issued.7 Section 219 amended
Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and authorized the
government to go before a single Federal magistrate judge in any judicial
district in which activities relating to professed terrorism may have occurred
to obtain a warrant to search property or a person within or without the dis-
trict.72 Assuming, hypothetically, that an irate individual used your e-mail
account to send an angry e-mail to Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska and that
the e-mail had the appearance of being intended to coerce or intimidate Sen-
ator Stevens to alter some of his political views, the FBI could go before a
magistrate in Alaska and obtain a warrant to search your property in Arkan-
sas (assuming you have property in Arkansas). If you wanted to have the
warrant quashed, you would have to find a way to appear before the court in
Alaska that issued the warrant. The FBI could make such travel even more
difficult if it froze your assets under its section 806 powers.
In sum, the Patriot Act's definition of domestic terrorism gives federal
prosecutors considerable powers and broad discretion regarding the cir-
cumstances in which to employ them. Even if one is willing to assume an
executive branch that judiciously and voluntarily curbs its own powers, the
fact that prosecutors are able to exercise so much discretion under the Pa-
triot Act's definition of domestic terrorism highlights a possible infirmity
with it-namely, that it uses such broad, vague language as to allow for ar-
bitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Although state and federal statutes
are generally entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality,73 they
69. 50U.S.C. § 1861.
70. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d).
71. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RETHINKING THE PATRIOT ACT: KEEPING AMERICA SAFE
AND FREE (2005).
72. Under prior law, Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required that
a search warrant be obtained within a district for searches within that district. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a) (2000).
73. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (stautes entitled to strong presumption of
constitutionality under rational basis review); Ark. Tobacco Control Bd. v. Sitton, 357 Ark.
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may be invalid as being impermissibly vague if they lack minimal legisla-
tive guidelines and permit arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
7 4
V. DOUBLEPLUSGOOD75 LAWS AND POLICIES FOR FIGHTING TERRORISM
Now, putting aside legal definitions of terrorism, it should be noted that
the federal government has made striking reforms in law and policy in re-
sponse to the threat of terrorism. Some of these policy changes are outlined
in a document entitled the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, which was published by the White House in September of 2002.76
As its title suggests, it provides an overview, in general terms, of the nation-
al security strategy of the United States. In no uncertain terms, it posits ter-
rorism as a greater threat to the United States than the threat posed by ar-
mies of nation states:
For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great
struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and
equality. That great struggle is over.... America is now threatened less
by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less
by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the
embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and
friends. 7
As expressed therein, the United States has adopted the adage that the
"best defense is a good offense" as a guiding precept of its war on terror,78
which translates into "increased emphasis on intelligence collection and
analysis" and a willingness to act preemptively against threats "even if un-
certainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack., 79 Although
international consensus may be sought, the United States reserves the right
357, 362, 166 S.W.3d 550, 553 (2004) ("All statutes are presumed constitutional and we
resolve all doubts in favor of constitutionality.").
74. Ark. Tobacco Control Bd., 357 Ark. at 362, 166 S.W.3d at 553 ("[A] statute is void
if it is so vague and standardless that it allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment.").
75. "Doubleplusgood" is a term from the fictional propaganda language "Newspeak" em-
ployed by the totalitarian government of Big Brother in its efforts to put a positive spin on its
activities. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classics 1977) (1949).
76. President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States
(Sept. 17, 2002) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssal.html).
77. President George W. Bush, Overview of America's International Strategy, (Sept. 2,
2002) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssl.html).
78. See id., quoting President Bush as saying, "While we recognize that our best defense
is a good offense, we are also strengthening America's homeland security to protect against
and deter attack." Id.
79. Id.
[Vol. 29
REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR ON TERROR
to launch such preemptive attacks unilaterally,8" as illustrated by the United
States led invasion of Iraq.
The Bush administration carried out its plan to increase government
emphasis on intelligence gathering with remarkable zeal, ultimately calling
for "the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration
created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense.'
This resulted in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), which coordinates the sharing of information gathered "both hori-
zontally across the government and vertically among federal, state and local
governments, private sector and citizens as outlined in the President's Na-
tional Strategy for Homeland Security."82 DHS employs a "computer-based
counterterrorism communications system connecting all fifty states, five
territories, Washington, D.C., and fifty major urban areas" in order to facili-
tate this information exchange.83 It refers to this network as the Homeland
Security Information Network,84 which allows all states and major urban
areas to collect and disseminate information between federal, state, and local
agencies involved in combating terrorism. 5
In its efforts to better detect and deter terrorism through intelligence
gathering, the executive branch even developed a top secret domestic sur-
veillance program carried out by the National Security Agency (NSA).86
What is troubling to some is that this surveillance was secretly extended to
American citizens, without court oversight or express Congressional ap-
proval.87 Although some people saw sinister shades of an Orwellian Big
Brother in all of this, the President sought to reassure the American people
that the domestic surveillance program was an essential part of the war on
80. Id. ("We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by... defending the United
States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroy-
ing the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to
enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if neces-
sary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to
prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.").
81. President George W. Bush, Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and
Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss3.html (Sept. 14, 2001).
82. Homeland Security, Homeland Security Information Network,




86. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets United States Spy on Callers Without






terror and that it has already foiled several terrorist plots."8 In response to
criticism that surveillance should have been conducted under judicial over-
sight as provided under the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act
(FISA), the White House issued a press release explaining that "because of
its speed, the NSA program has provided crucial information otherwise not
available."'89
Not content with passive surveillance, the United States government al-
so took a more aggressive, proactive approach to intelligence gathering by
using extraordinary rendition to capture and interrogate persons it suspected
of having information.90 It also developed secret, hands-on interrogation
techniques 9 that have been employed, presumably to great effect, in secret
prisons,92 where persons have apparently been held incommunicado and
without due process.93 The exact details of this program and the nature of
these techniques are not publicly discussed by the government, as doing so
may provide terrorists with information that they could use to "harm our
country.', 94 However, accounts from some of the former subjects of the new
interrogation techniques-rumored to include beatings, electric shock,95
88. See President George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses NSA Surveillance Pro-
gram (May 11, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060511-1.html). Critics of the NSA
program clearly fail to understand that the terrorists are attacking our freedoms, which is why
we should temporarily surrender them to the government for safekeeping.
89. White House, Setting the Record Straight: Critics Launch Attacks Against Program
to Detect and Prevent Terrorist Acts, (Dec. 19, 2005)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/0 1/20060104-7.html.
90. Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST, Dec.
4, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301476.html.
91. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, United States Decries Abuse but Defends Interroga-
tions, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A37943-2002Dec25?language=printer. According to one CIA official, the "gloves came
off" during interrogations. John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24,
2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989422/#storyContinued.
92. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions
to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html).
93. CNN.com, Report: CIA Operates Secret Prisons, (Nov. 2, 2005)
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/l1/02/terror.suspects/index.html.
94. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions
to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html) ("Many specifics of
this program, including where these detainees have been held and the details of their con-
fmement, cannot be divulged. Doing so would provide our enemies with information they
could use to take retribution against our allies and harm our country.").
95. CIA Operates Secret Prisons, supra not 93. Some of those seized and shipped to
third countries have said they were drugged, beaten and subjected to electric shocks while in
custody overseas. Id.
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water boarding,96 mock executions,97 and sexual humiliation gS-suggest that
they seem strikingly similar to, if not exactly like, conduct that is prohibited
under Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits,
among other things, "outrages upon personal dignity" and "humiliating and
degrading treatment." 99
Although sexual humiliation and other such interrogation techniques
may seem calculated to humiliate and degrade, these techniques were tech-
nically fair game in the war on terror because the Geneva Conventions apply
only to "prisoners of war," not non-state actors or enemy combatants. At
least that was the contention of the United States Justice Department for a
time.' By branding detainees enemy combatants as opposed to prisoners of
war, and by narrowly defining torture,'0 ' the executive branch sought to ad-
vance beyond the "quaint" restrictions of the Geneva conventions."°'
Unfortunately for the President, the United States Supreme Court com-
plicated the use of some of these secret and "tough" interrogation techniques
by holding that Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions applies
even to enemy combatants. 0 3 The Court also held that that the Guantanamo
96. Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA 's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described,
(Nov. 18, 2005) http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866. Water Board-
ing is a technique whereby a prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head
slightly below the feet, has cellophane wrapped over his face and water poured over him to
cause the perception of drowning. Id.
97. Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel for the Dept. of Defense
(Nov. 27, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dodmemos.pdf) (Defense Department Memo, page 6, subsection (f),
concluding that creation of scenarios "designed to convince the detainee that death or severe-
ly painful consequences are imminent," are legal, including, specifically, the "use of a wet
towel to induce the misperception of suffocation.").
98. Salon.com, Standard Operating Procedure,
http://www.salon.com/news/abughraib/2006/03/14/chapterl/index.html (last visited Apr.
10, 2006).
99. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
100. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel (Aug. 1, 2002) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf.).
101. See id. In the view expressed by the Bybee/Justice Department memo, physical
torture "must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death." For a cruel or inhuman
psychological technique to rise to the level of mental torture, the Justice Department argued,
the psychological harm must last "months or even years." Id.
102. See id.; Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales for President Bush (Jan. 25, 2002)
(available at http://msnbc.com/modules/newsweek/pdf/gonzales-memo.pdf) (referring to the
Geneva Conventions as "quaint" and "obsolete" in light of the new paradigm of war against
terror).
103. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
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military commissions violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice."04 Ap-
parently the Court failed to appreciate that denying the executive branch the
power to detain enemy combatants indefinitely without having to level or
prove criminal charges would allow presumably innocent persons, such as
Maher Arar and Khalid El-Masri, to be subjected to the inconvenience and
expense associated with defending oneself against a criminal charge. Thanks
to the practice of secret, summary arrest and detention, Maher Arar1° and
Khalid El-Masri . .6 were both detained in secret prisons and, according to
their accounts, tortured, without having been charged with any crime. If
their claims are to be believed, the United States government eventually
determined that it had made a mistake in detaining them and released them
both after months of incarceration without ever having leveled any charges
against them. 10 7  By a conservative estimate, bypassing due process for
Maher Arar and Khalid El-Masri spared taxpayers at least a few thousand
dollars in prosecution costs.
After the Supreme Court ruled that the protections of Common Article
Three of the Geneva Conventions also apply to enemy combatants (at least
American citizens detained as enemy combatants), the executive branch
sought legislative support for the CIA's aggressive new program of interro-
gation for persons deemed unlawful enemy combatants.108 President Bush
lobbied Congress for passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (the
MC Act), which was signed into law on October 17, 2006.1"
The MC Act fits in well with a program of intelligence gathering that
relies on tough interrogation techniques because, under the right circums-
tances, it allows statements coerced from detainees by means of torture to be
used as evidence before the military commission. ° Although the MC Act
104 Id.
105. CBSNews.com, His Year in Hell, Canadian Tells Vicki Mabrey that He Was De-
ported to Syria (Jan. 21, 2004)
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/21/6011/main594974.shtml.
106. Scott Pelley, CIA Flying Suspects to Torture? (Mar. 6, 2005)
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/04/60minutes/main678155.shtml.
107. See supra notes 104 and 106. As illustrated by the plight of Maher Arar and Khalid
El-Masri, if taken as true, allowing the government to skip the tediousness of due process
may occasionally result in injury to innocent persons, but it spares detainees the bureaucratic
hassles and the stigma associated with defending against unwarranted criminal charges-a
happy thought that such persons can hang on to during those otherwise bleak moments when
they are being suffocated with a wet towel.
108. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Oct.
17, 2006) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/l0/20061017.html).
As defined by the MC Act, an unlawful enemy combatant is "a person who has engaged in
hostilities or who has purposely and materially supported hostilities against the United States
or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful combatant." 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
109. Id.
110. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948r.
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generally excludes statements made as the result of torture from being en-
tered as evidence before a military commission, such statements may be
admitted as evidence if (1) the government disputes the degree of coercion
employed; and (2) if the military judge finds that "the totality of the cir-
cumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient proba-
tive value" and that "the interests of justice would best be served by admis-
sion of the statement into evidence." '' However, if a statement was coerced
on or after December 30, 2005 (the date of the enactment of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005), then it is flatly inadmissible if it is determined that
the interrogation methods used to obtain the statement amounted to "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment prohibited by section 1003 of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005."l 12
Regardless of any qualms they may have about the MC Act making al-
lowances for the admissibility of coerced testimony, even critics of military
tribunals would probably agree that the MC Act is a model of efficiency. "
3
The MC Act eliminates the need for government agents to waste time trying
to figure out what rights their wards may claim under the Geneva Conven-
tions when dealing with an "alien unlawful enemy combatant" because Sec-
tion 948b(G) of the MC Act provides that "[n]o alien unlawful enemy com-
batant subject to trial by military commission under [the MC Act] may in-
voke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights."'1 4 Furthermore, the
MC Act eliminates the opportunity for enemy combatants to squander judi-
cial resources by requesting habeas corpus review because the MC Act now
formally cuts them off from habeas corpus relief."5 This apparently
represents a post facto codification of what the de facto policy of the execu-
tive branch seems to have been towards enemy combatants all along.
The MC Act also minimizes cumbersome checks and balances by con-
solidating certain judicial functions within the executive branch. For exam-
ple, in the MC Act, the United States Congress generously gives the Presi-
111. Id.
112. Id. § 948r(d).
113. See Richard J. Wilson, Military Commissions in Guantanamo Bay: Giving "Full and
Fair Trial" A Bad Name, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 63, 65 (2006-2007). Professor Richard J.
Wilson contends that "[t]he true reason for the choice of military commissions is the adminis-
tration's misguided belief and a historical reading of the use of these tribunals as a shortcut; a
quick and dirty way to curtail and eliminate due process and fair trial norms that have been
carefully crafted for use in courts-martial and criminal trials. And the sole true purpose of
commission law is, in my view, to convict."
114. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgiin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109 congbills&docid=f:s3930enr
.txt.
115. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006)).
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dent the power to interpret law 16-a judicial power that Congress itself does
not possess. 17 In this regard, the administrative efficiency possible under the
MC Act is a marvel, rivaled in recent history perhaps only by the Enabling
Act of 1933 and the Reichstag Fire Decree, which suspended the right of
habeas corpus and gave the Chancellor of Germany the power of summary
arrest and imprisonment.18 Fortunately, as noted by President Bush in the
opening paragraph of the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, the great struggle against totalitarianism is over, and we can put
such memories behind us.
VI. REDEFINING THE PROBLEM, RETHINKING THE POLICY
How have the policies identified in the National Security Strategy of
the United States along with the acts committed and laws enacted in further-
ance of them served our nation as a means of reducing the threat of global
terrorism and advancing our national security? Our nation finds itself facing
its greatest deficits ever" 9 and dramatically high levels of Anti-American
sentiment internationally."2 ' Our military personnel and our national coffers
are being bled daily in a war that was purportedly commenced to destroy
Iraq's nuclear program and to disarm it of weapons of mass destruction-
weapons we have since learned Iraq did not possess. The Iraq war has
turned into a bloody occupation that has cost more American lives than the
attacks of 9/11 and that has left over 150,000 veterans disabled.' 2' After
116. Section 6(a)(3) of the MC Act provides that "the President has the authority for the
United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions." Id.
117. See, e.g., Kinne v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 104 (1990) ("Congress may not abrogate
and the courts may not abdicate judicial branch's responsibility to interpret the law.").
118. An unpatriotic soul might quip that the founding fathers came to the colonies to
escape just this sort of justice system, but he or she would be wrong because even the English
tyrants recognized the right to habeas corpus since at least 1215 A.D. Richard M. Ebeling,
Civil Liberty and the State: The Writ of Habeas Corpus,
http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0204c.asp (last visited Apr. 2002).
119. The United States trade deficit set a record for the fifth straight year in 2006, rising
to a record $763.6 billion, which marks a 6.5 percent increase from the previous record of
$716.7 billion set in 2005. CBSNews.com, United States Trade Deficit Sets Another Record,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/13/business/main246943 1.shtml?source=RSSattr=-
Business_2469431 (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). According to the United States Treasury, as
of February 25, 2007, the United States Public Debt is equal to $ 8,768,614,254,781.88. The
Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It,
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
120. See America's Image Slips, but Allies Share United States Concerns over Iran, Ha-
mas, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PagelD=825; MSNBC.com, China More Pop-
ular Than United States Overseas, June 23, 2005, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8324290/.
121. Aaron Glantz, Iraq Vets Left in Mental and Physical Agony, (Jan. 3, 2007) available
at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36056 (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) ("On New Year's
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factoring in the cost of long-term healthcare for wounded veterans, rebuild-
ing a worn-down military, and accounting for other economic losses, the
cost of the Iraq war could easily surpass two trillion dollars. 122 According to
the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the war in Iraq has actually caused
the flame of hatred to burn brighter in the hearts and minds of many Mus-
lims, apparently increasing the threat posed by global jihadism. 123 The 9/11
Commission Report and the NIE identifies jihadism as the most serious
source of terrorist violence against the United States. 124 In sum, the war on
terror as conceived and carried out by the current administration has cost our
nation more in blood and treasure than the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and has
made the United States a more attractive target for jihadist terrorism.
The failure of massive military force projection as a means of defeating
terrorism should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with modem mil-
itary history. The Vietnam War, the Algerian War of Independence, and the
Soviet War in Afghanistan all amply illustrate how difficult it is for a for-
eign military force, even with superior military capability, to outlast a well-
armed, determined, and thoroughly entrenched guerilla force that enjoys
popular support and is able to live among the local population. In addition to
the home court advantage that comes from knowing local people, language,
and terrain, another dynamic favoring local insurgents is that a small num-
ber of insurgents can inexpensively inflict a steady toll of asymmetrical
damage on foreign military forces through the use of guerilla/terrorist tac-
tics. Because occupying forces bear the cost of such attacks so disproportio-
nately, simple economics favor an entrenched guerrilla insurgency over
time. One can imagine that the cumulative cost of sustaining such damage
Eve, the number of United States soldiers killed in Iraq passed 3,000. By Tuesday, the death
toll had reached 3,004-31 more than died in the Sep. 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre
and the Pentagon."); United States Deaths in Iraq, War on Terror Surpass 9/11 Toll, (Sept. 3,
2006), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/03/death.toll/ (last visited
Apr. 16, 2007). Al-Jazeera, citing a report by the Department of Veteran's Affairs to Con-
gress and a December 7, 2006 letter to President Bush from seven members of Congress,
indicates the Pentagon count may be underreported by several multiples. Still Lying About
Real Iraq Deaths, May 14, 2006, http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?serviceID=l 1372 (last
visited Apr. 16, 2007).
122. Linda Blimes & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Ap-
praisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict, (Jan. 2006),
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/cost-of war in iraq.pdf. (last visited Apr. 16,
2007); James Stemgold, Casualty of War: The United States Economy, July 17, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/07/17/MNG5GDPEK31.DTL&type=printable (last visited Apr.
16, 2007) (estimating the cost of the Iraq war to exceed seven trillion dollars).
123. See Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in





over time eventually grows to gargantuan proportions and that the economic
cost to the occupying force eventually becomes so great that there is no eco-
nomic incentive to stay the course. Such a supposition can actually draw
some support from the Counterinsurgency manual (the "Manual") published
by the United States Department of Defense, which acknowledges that
"maintaining security in an unstable environment requires vast resources,
whether host nation, United States, or multinational. In contrast, a small
number of highly motivated insurgents with simple weapons, good opera-
tions security, and even limited mobility can undermine security over a large
area" and that "[p]rotracted conflicts favor insurgents, and no approach
makes better use of that asymmetry than the protracted popular war."'25 The
Manual also notes that "[p]rotracted urban terrorism waged by small, inde-
pendent cells requires little or no popular support. It is difficult to coun-
ter."'26 This does not bode well for United States efforts to occupy and sta-
bilize a country that is filled with various local factions vying for power and
employing terrorist tactics.
Despite all of their rhetoric about the importance of adopting a post-
9/11 mentality' 7 and the need to win hearts and minds,'28 the architects of
the war on terror have apparently resorted to conventional pre-9/1 1 military
tactics that seem more appropriate for engaging a traditional nation-state and
that seem very unlikely to win many hearts and minds.'29 Since the war on
terror's inception, President Bush has employed rhetoric regarding the war
125. David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos, FM-324, MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency,
(Dec. 15, 2006) 1.10, 1.30, http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fn3-
24.pdf.
126. Id. 1.29.
127. Press Release, White House, Press Gaggle with Scott McClellan (Oct. 1, 2004)
(available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/l0/20041001-8.html) (criticiz-
ing presidential candidate John Kerry's multi-front approach to winning the war on terrorism
as exhibiting a pre-9/11 mentality).
128. Our National Stragtegy for Victory in Iraq: Helping the Iraqi People Defeat the
Terrorists and Build an Inclusive Democratic State,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html#partl (last visited Apr.
16, 2007).
129. On a conceptual level, a global war on terror is tantamount to a worldwide war
against terrorist violence or a war for world peace. There is a certain logical incongruity and
oxymoronic quality to the idea of a war against violence or a war for world peace. The appar-
ent incongruity between the means of war and peaceful ends suggests that it may be counter-
productive to use war and the rhetoric of war as a means of eliminating ideologically moti-
vated violence. At the very least it indicates that, to avoid the appearance of incongruity,
government efforts to reduce violence and/or promote peace should not be characterized as a
"war" on terror. Even where military intervention may be necessary to address certain terror-
ist threats, it seems that, from a public relations standpoint, the United States is likely to find
a warmer international reception for its counter-terrorism efforts if it casts them in terms of a
"global peace initiative" rather than a global war on terror.
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that evinces a desire to equate it with traditional state-versus-state conflict. 30
As made painfully evident by the Iraq war, military tactics that are effective
in traditional warfare against a nation-state may barely scratch the surface of
a terrorist movement and can even serve to fuel anti-American sentiment
and engender support for the jihadist cause in Muslim communities. Now
jihadists throughout the world can point to civilian casualties caused by
United States bombing raids in Iraq and Afghanistan 13' as a rallying cry for
Jihad'12 and as justification for killing American civilians. 33 Considering
that Osama Bin Laden cited the presence of a United States military forces
in the holy land of Saudi Arabia as a primary justification for the 9/11 at-
tacks, 134 it would seem that large scale military incursions into the middle
east may not be the best means of diffusing the threat of jihadist terrorism.
Rather than reducing the resentment that fuels the jihadist movement, mili-
tary interventionism adds fuel to the fire.
Military invasion, forced regime change, and occupation are not the op-
timal tools for halting the rise ofjihadist terrorism for a number of reasons.
The very properties that distinguish terrorist organizations from nation-
states, such as the lack of territorial boundaries, lack of political accountabil-
ity to a population, and lack of a well-defined hierarchical government,
make them difficult targets for conventional military operations. The decen-
tralized, transnational nature of the jihadist movement makes it nearly im-
possible to find all of its members and sympathizers and renders the move-
ment largely immune to efforts to cripple it by removing a few key promi-
nent figures or leaders. Furthermore, because the jihadist ideology tran-
scends its individual members, the jihadist movement can survive the death
130. For example, on June 2, 2004, President Bush declared that "like the Second World
War, our present conflict began with a ruthless surprise attack on the United States." Presi-
dent George W. Bush, Speech at Air Force Academy Graduation (June 2, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040602.html).
131. BBC News, Afganishtan 's Civilian Deaths Mount,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/southasia/1740538.stm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) (stating
that number of Afghan civilians killed by United States bombs has surpassed the death toll of
the September 11 attacks); Press Release, Amnesty International, Iraq: Use of Cluster
Bombs--Civilians Pay the Price (Apr. 2, 2003) (available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde 140652003) (stating that United States' use of
cluster bombs kills Iraqi civilians).
132. "The Iraq conflict has become the cause celebre for jihadists, breeding a deep re-
sentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global
jihadist movement." NIE,
http://www.dni.gov/pressreleases/DeclassifiedNIEKeyJudgments.pdf (last visited Apr.
16, 2007).
133. Letter from Osama Bin Laden to America (Nov. 24, 2002) (available at
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,845725,00.html) ("[W]hoever has




or capture of individual leaders; therefore, elimination of specific terrorist
leaders may have little or no negative impact on the broader terrorist move-
ment since terrorist cells can independently decide how to carry out the ob-
jectives of the movement with little need or no need for a formal, hierar-
chical organizational connection between every cell. In fact, when a promi-
nent leader is captured or killed, other members of the movement can tout
the individual as a martyr and use the incident as a recruiting opportunity.135
In this regard, the jihadist terrorist movement is analogous to the Lernean
hydra: If you cut off one of its heads, two new ones may shoot up in its
place.
Based on the aforesaid, it seems that a shift away from the pre 9/11 pa-
radigm that posits terrorism as analogous to a traditional, nation-state mili-
tary opponent is in order. The military invasion of Iraq has not only proven
to be an ineffective means of neutralizing anti-American sentiment and ji-
hadist ideology, it has actually impaired our national security because (1) it
has stretched our national resources thin, thereby reducing our capacity to
respond to and rebound from natural disasters or other attacks; (2) it has
saddled United States taxpayers with an astronomical debt burden because
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are being financed with deficit spending;
(3) the military strength of the United States ultimately depends on the na-
tion's economic strength and the cost of the concurrent wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan has been staggering, both monetarily and in terms of "human
capital"; (4) forcing regime change destabilized Iraq and has strengthened
Iran's position and influence in the region; and (5) forcing regime change in
Iraq created a power vacuum that has drawn warring factions into a bloody
power struggle and created an environment of anarchy that allows terrorists
an ideal staging ground as well as an ample supply of disenchanted and/or
displaced individuals who can more easily be recruited into terrorist organi-
zations. Furthermore, our national commitment to the Iraq war has arguably
diverted national resources and attention away from other important national
issues, such as our dependence on foreign oil,'36 the rapidly rising cost of
medical care and health insurance,'37 the continued decline in employment
135. See Charles J. Hanley, Killing Terrorist Leaders Often Fuels Movement, Experts
Say, CMCAGO SuN-TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, at A3 1.
136. Martin Feldstein, Oil Dependence and National Security: A Market-Based System
for Reducing United States Vulnerability, http://www.nber.org/feldstein/oil.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2007).
137. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) (noting that, among
some economists, rapidly rising health care spending is considered to lower the rate of
growth in GDP and overall employment, while raising inflation). Relying on anecdotal expe-
rience alone, one may surmise that a larger number of Americans are more likely to suffer
health problems than they are likely to experience a terrorist attack.
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in the manufacturing sector,"' inadequate emergency response services, 139 as
well as social security and immigration reform. Whatever the final military
outcome is in Iraq, it seems certain that the Iraq war will register as an eco-
nomic loss on the national ledger.
Considering the undeniable cost and the apparent ineffectiveness of us-
ing military invasions as the primary means of eliminating or reducing the
threat of global terrorism and the jihadist movement, what other law and
policy options remain that might be more effective?'40 Since the policy of
preemptive military aggression at the heart of the Bush doctrine has failed as
strategy for reducing jihadist terrorism, then perhaps it should be replaced
by a multifaceted, international antiterrorism campaign that seeks to win
popular international support, especially among the populations from which
the jihadist movement presently draws its recruits, through diplomacy, tar-
geted social assistance, intercultural exchange, and social influence aimed at
reducing the various grievances that feed and sustain jihadist terrorist
groups. 4' In other words, an international campaign of diplomacy and social
engagement that does not seek to win hearts and minds through the force of
138. Id.
139. Press Release, Congressman Dave Reichert, Reichert Begins Series of Committee
Hearings on Interoperability (Feb. 14, 2006) (available at
http://www.house.gov/reichert/press06/2.14.06.shtml).
140. This is a question for us to consider collectively and is undoubtedly beyond the
capacity of any one person to answer completely. Theoretically, increased control of individ-
ual access to destructive technology may be part of a national approach to reducing the threat
of terrorism, but such an approach is unrealistic as a practical matter and is deficient in that
elements outside of the controlled system could still come into the country and commit acts
of terrorism. Increased sanctions for the commission of terrorist acts also remains an option,
but the disturbing tendency of some terrorists to kill themselves raises the question of wheth-
er even the strictest sanctions are likely to have much, if any, deterrent effect. This, coupled
with the magnitude of harm that can be inflicted by a completed terrorist act, suggests that the
emphasis should lie on prevention of, rather than punishment for, acts of terrorism. To the
extent stricter sanctions are employed as a deterrent, emphasis should be placed on penalizing
conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism. Intelligence gathering is clearly essential to detecting
and arresting terrorists at the conspiracy stage. This, however should not translate into a carte
blanch for the government to gather intelligence in ways that violate civil rights and/or appli-
cable laws. Changing our domestic criminal laws to increase penalties for conspiracy to
commit terrorist acts, however, is unlikely to have much impact on foreign terrorists who
conspire abroad and then come to the United States to execute their developed plan(s). This
suggests that a broader, international effort is essential if we are to address the threat posed
by international terrorism and the global j ihadist movement.
141. See Yassin El-Ayouty, International Terrorism Under the Law, 5 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 485, 488 (1999) ("The eventual success of peace between the Palestinians and the
Israelis would constitute an immense boost in the global campaign against terror. The world
confrontation against terrorism should also take into account the socio-economic causes of
terrorism where poverty, hopelessness, and the non-observance of human rights drive young
people in the arms of terrorism where they find communal support, an identity and a cause
through which they vent their anger through the heinous crime of terror.").
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bullets, bombs, or bayonets, but through compassion. 14 2 This is not to say
that military force should not be employed in anti-terrorism efforts under
any circumstance, only that our use of military force should be tempered by
compassion. 143
142. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, COMPASSION AND TERROR, IN TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 229, 231 (James P. Sterba ed., 2003). Although it may sound quaint,
compassion is arguably the basis of law, without which the native principle of governance
seems to be that might makes right. The principle of compassion has been articulated in vari-
ous ways throughout the history of Western civilization, such as in the Golden Rule's "Do
unto others as you would have others do unto you;" Jesus Christ's maxim "Therefore all
things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the
law and the prophets, Matthew 7:12 (King James); and Immanuel Kant's Categorical Impera-
tive, "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should
become a universal law." Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 37, 57 (Mary J. Gregor trans. & ed., 1996).
143. Military action, where necessary, should only be one element of a much broader
campaign of asset-tracing, counterintelligence, diplomatic coalition-building, and social
influence. Rather than relying primarily on military force projection, the United States should
target the ideological heart of the jihadist movement and endeavor to strip it of legitimacy or
appeal among Muslim populations. This would seem to require a clear understanding of what
the group's motivating ideology is and what makes it appealing or persuasive to its members
and supporters, which will require familiarity with (1) the language in which the ideology is
expressed; (2) the characteristics of the demographic group that the terrorist organization taps
for recruits; (3) the cultural context that makes the ideology resonate with its members and
potential recruits; and (4) how the ideology is disseminated and or inculcated. A comprehen-
sive campaign against jihadist ideology may include all or some of the following goals:
(A) Advance moderate, culturally relevant, alternative ideologies in Muslim coun-
tries. Such ideologies can be popularized through a variety of means, including (1) the
establishment and funding of schools that offer free or inexpensive education to the po-
tential recruit populace and which inculcate a moderate, pluralistic, worldview; (2) sup-
porting a free press in Muslim countries such as Iran where state control of media out-
lets disallows criticism of the governing clerocracy; (3) promoting moderate Muslim
scholarship; (4) popularizing moderate Imams and increasing their social influence
through various means, such as directing some social assistance through such Imams
and through increased favorable media exposure; and (5) indirect media campaigns,
such as films and literature, espousing alternative moderate ideologies. One significant
difficulty that the United States faces in carrying out an ideological campaign against j i-
hadism, however, is that the restraints imposed by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution leave the United States government ill equipped to take sides in a
war of ideas, especially religious ones.
(B) Better Public Relations. Efforts should be aimed at improving the image of the
United States in Muslim countries by (1) openly working to address and remedy social
conditions that the radical ideologues point to as causus belli; (2) acting through or with
Muslim partners or agents where possible when engaging in military or police actions;
and (3) avoiding violations (actual and/or apparent) of international law in the prosecu-
tion of the war on terror.
(C) Cut off funding. Efforts should be aimed at identifying schools, institutions, and
community leaders that promote jihadism and, where possible, cutting them off from
their funding sources. Where funding to such institutions can not be cut off outright, re-
sources can be directed to marketing (and, if need be, creating) moderate competitors.
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Tempering our use of military force with compassion would mean a
return to the principles of proportionality and military necessity that are al-
ready presumably guiding principles of civilized nations engaged in war.'"
Compassionate principles seem to dictate that we use diplomacy, economic
incentives, and other means of social and political influence to effect social
changes in other nation-states in which there is no immediate or imminent
military threat to our nation-persuasion'4 5 rather than invasion. However,
military force clearly remains an option where it is necessary to deal with an
imminent threat. A compassionate policy regarding the use of force would
not stand in the way of using military force where military intervention will
clearly save lives, and even dictates the use of force where it will save more
lives than it takes. Compassion says yes to self-defense, but no to unneces-
(D) Delegitimize the notion that violence is a valid means of effecting social, reli-
gious, or political change. Concerted efforts should be made to popularize non-violent
approaches to effecting social change, such as those espoused by Ghandi and Martin
Luther King, and to stigmatize the use of violence to coerce change. The promotion of
non-violence coincides with fostering democratic principles so that governments will be
more responsive to non-violent means of influence.
(E) Erode popular support for terrorist ideologies. Various efforts can be directed
towards achieving this end, including the following: (1) launching public information
campaigns that educate the potential recruit pool and populace supporting militant Is-
lamists about the abysmal track record of the militant Islamists in actually implementing
Sharia (Afghanistan, Algeria, etc.) and questionable or demonstrably inaccurate inter-
pretations of authoritative texts which are used in support of the radical Islamic move-
ment; (2) exposing and discrediting propagators of terrorist ideology as hypocritical ma-
nipulators of religious sentiment; and (3) propagating counter arguments supported by
respected Islamic authority, such as the Qu-ran, Qu-ranic scholars, etc.
(F) Foster cultural interchange of ideas between the United States and countries
with Muslim majorities and with Muslim communities. Domestically, efforts should
be made to help Muslims in the United States feel appreciated and integrated so that
they can aid in United States efforts at monitoring and responding to the Islamist
movement. Internationally, the United States has deliberately cut off diplomatic ties
with some countries with Muslim majorities, which has weakened the possibility of the
United States exerting strong diplomatic influence; therefore, the United States should
reestablish diplomatic ties as a means of increasing influence.
All of these are certainly easier said than done, but there is no reason to believe that some
progress cannot be made with sustained effort.
144. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105-06 (2000); 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW at 420 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds. 9th
ed., 1992). Historically, the United States has been in the vanguard of efforts to promote the
objective of giving the greatest possible protection to civilians during armed conflicts, consis-
tent with legitimate military aims. William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-
September 1 1th Proposal to Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 Miss. L.J. 639, 853 (2004). So
such an ethos is actually part of our national military tradition and not foreign to it.
145. Although persuasion requires patience, rash use of force where there is no imminent




sary or disproportionate aggression.'46 Our extended, costly, and escalating
involvement in Iraq may demonstrate the wisdom of this thinking.
With regard to torture, compassion-driven policies would, as a general
rule, have us eschew using torture as an instrument of the State and reserve
punishments for persons who have had a meaningful opportunity to chal-
lenge the charges against them. By the same token, a policy informed by
compassion would generally discourage kidnapping and delivering sus-
pected terrorists to countries known to torture prisoners. Although some
academics suggest that compassion actually requires the use of torture
where it is the only means to preserve innocent lives,'47 the converse is that
compassion would not allow torture where there is no evidence that it will
preserve any innocent lives, where the captive person may be innocent or
lack relevant information, or where there are other alternative means of pre-
serving those innocent lives. 8 Using torture and gaining a reputation for
using torture is likely to erode the international goodwill that the United
States will need if it is to obtain widespread and earnest cooperation in its
anti-terrorism efforts. Accordingly, to the extent that the United States seeks
international approval and support for its antiterrorism efforts, it would seem
that both compassion and practical considerations of seeking international
support require the United States to recognize international law and human
rights as binding constraints on its own use of force.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a check to national hubris and imperial overreach, it may serve us
well to recall that, even though we stand in the congregation of the mighty,
we too may fall if we do not proceed justly and prudently. In light of the
unfortunate fact that technological advances have increased the destructive
capacity available to aggrieved individuals, our international relations
should be governed by compassionate principles that reduce the reasonable
basis that others have for feeling justified in engaging in terrorist violence
against us. Ultimately it is in our own best interest, economically and other-
wise, to refrain from causing unnecessary death and injury to innocent civi-
146. Compassion would require taking every reasonable effort to avoid targeting civilians
and to avoid the use of highly destructive or indiscriminate weapons, such as cluster bombs,
in civilian areas.
147. Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Tortured Responses (A Reply to Our Critics): Physi-
cally Persuading Suspects Is Morally Preferable to Allowing the Innocent to Be Murdered,
40 U.S.F.L. REv. 703, 707 (2006) ("We condone torture in only one circumstance: as a
means to save innocent lives. We condone it only for one reason: compassion.").
148. The abuses at Abu Ghraib, for example, were not been reported to have preserved
any innocent lives or to have positively advanced our national interest in any way, and so,
there is no justification for such conduct as acts of compassion.
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lians through full-scale military invasions in which non-military alternatives
remain viable means of effecting social or political change, because the de-
mocratization of destructive power puts us in easy reach of reprisal. In a
post-9/11 world where even a mighty nation can be injured by an embittered
few, we should endeavor to strengthen and maintain friendly international
relations so that we multiply the number of our allies rather than the number
of our enemies.

